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AN EXAMINATION OF THE ACCOUNTING
PROVISIONS OF THE FCP A
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Before I discuss the accounting provisions of the FCP A, I
would like to make a few random observations about the earlier
discussions. Judging from the tenor of the first speaker, one might
wonder why there has been such a great controversy over the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),1 an Act which actually has
very little to do with foreign corrupt practices, at least in some of
its applications.
I disagree, in some respects, with what I have heard about
the impact of the FCP A regarding the antibribery provisions. 2 It
may he that, in some countries, bribes are the rule rather than the
exception. Every country in which there were payoffs, I believe,
had strict laws against taking such payments. Nevertheless,
businessmen and lawyers who practice in the international area
have suggested to me that there continue to be problems in countries throughout the world. The Carter Administration argued
that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, by prohibiting types of
payments which arguably may not violate the intent of the Act,
operates as an export disincentive. I do not know whether that is
true or not. I would note, however, that President Carter was of
the view that the lack of guidance on the antibribery provisions
was itself an export disincentive, and that Justice Department
guidance was necessary.
II.

THE ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS

Let me try to put into context the controversy surrounding
the accounting provisions. First, it is important to understand that

* Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Washington, D.C.; Co-Chairman, ABA Ad Hoc
Comm. on Revision of the FCPA, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law.
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Appendix I, infra.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 and -2 (Supp. V 1981).
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the accounting provisions are part of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and apply to all issuers which register securities with the
SEC. 3 The provisions apply to all such issuers, whether or not
they do business overseas. The Act, as it is applied through the accounting provisions, has absolutely nothing to do with foreign corrupt practices; it has to do with accounting, including the maintenance of books and records, and the establishment and maintenance
of a system of internal accounting controls.
I think it is important to start with an understanding of how
the Act was presented to the corporate community at the time it
was passed, because the context in which the words were used
and the purpose for which the accounting provisions were intended created the great controversy. It is important to understand
that people who never heard of the bribery of foreign officials
woke up one day and found that an Act had just been passed
which applied to them in very significant ways. This was an Act
which they had never heard of, had never thought involved them,
had never paid any attention to, and had never understood. They
listened to the lawyers and accountants explain it to them and still
did not understand. Alan Levenson, a former director of the Division of Corporate Finance, said that it was the most extensive application of federal securities law to internal corporate affairs
since the passage of the Acts in 1933 and 1934. 4
An American Bar Association Committee issued a guide to
the new provision 5 which declared that, because the 1934 Act was
concerned about financial disclosure which would assist investors
in making investment decisions, the new accounting provisions
were also directed at financial disclosure to investors. It is important to understand what people were saying about the accounting
provisions at the time. Daniel L. Goelzer, who is now General
Counsel of the SEC, said:
Finally the [Foreign Corrupt Practices] Act has important implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission. The incorporation of the accounting provisions into the federal
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The accounting provisions are reprinted in
Appendix I infra.
4. Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Discussed at New
York Law Journal Seminar, [1978] 451 SEC. REG . & L. REP. (BNA) D-1, D-1, quoting Alan B.
Levenson, formerly Director of the Commission's Division of Corporate Finance, cited in
Goelzer, Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act- the Federalization
of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1979).
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securities laws confers on the Commission new rulemaking and
enforcement authority over the control and recordkeeping mechanisms of its registrants. Broadly speaking, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act reflects a Congressional determination that the
scope of the federal securities laws and the Commission's
authority should be expanded beyond the traditional ambit of
disclosure requirements. Accordingly, the Commission's General
Counsel, Ralph C. Ferrara, has noted that the scope and impact
of the accounting provisions may be analagous to that of the antifraud sections of the federal securities laws. In any event, the
consequences of adding substantive requirements governing accounting control to the federal securities laws may significantly
augment the degree of federal involvement in the internal
management of public corporations. 6

Mr. Goelzer's position is made clearer by the following statement:
"While reporting issuers are already subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction, the accounting provisions expand the Commission's
authority over the issuer's information systems, analagous to that
which it exercises over securities professionals." 7 This refers to
the authority that the SEC has over broker dealers who are
registered with it under section 17 of the Securities Exchange
Act, which gives the SEC authority to define the records which
the broker must keep and maintain. 8 Section 17 does not have an
explicit rulemaking provision in it, but the SEC argued that its
general rulemaking grant was sufficient to give it this authority
with respect to all issuers.
I think it is fair to say that the first message that came from
the SEC was that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was a way of
assuring corporate accountability. It was viewed by some as a
mechanism for furthering ideals of corporate governance which, up
until that time, had been attempted primarily through jawboning
by various Commissioners or by hoping that people would voluntarily cooperate. It was not then clear, nor is it now clear, that the
SEC has the authority to do many of the things that it sought to do
under the Act. For example, Harold M. Williams, former Chair5. ABA Comm. on Corp. Law and Accounting, A Guide to the N ew S ection 13fb)(2)
Accoun ting Requirem ents of the S ecurities E xchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. LAW. 307
(1978).
6. Goelzer, Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-The
Federalization of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP . L. 1, 5 (1979).
7. Id. at 20.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (Supp. II 1978).
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man of the Commission, asked then General Counsel Harvey L.
Pitt what authority there might be to require companies to have
audit committees comprised of independent directors. One of the
sources of authority which General Counsel Pitt came up with was
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It is hard to understand how
the requirements of internal controls and accurate books and
records can be interpreted to also require outside directors. State
laws have no such requirements. Nor do state laws require that
outside directors be put on audit committees, or that the audit
committees be given the responsibility of making sure that the
systems of internal control function properly. Nevertheless, the
SEC asserts such authority.
Business people were concerned about how far the SEC would
push its authority. They became even more concerned when the
SEC proposed a requirement that management report on internal
controls. The fear was that people would be singled out. For example, some staff members suggested that if someone put in an expense voucher for twenty dollars for a taxicab, and actually that
person drove to the airport that day, or if someone put in a
voucher for a meal and actually had gone out to eat with his
girlfriend, then those people had violated the Act. There was no
materiality threshhold with respect to what violated the accurate
books and records provision, section 13(b)(2)(A).
In addition, corporations which discovered they had an internal accounting control which was not working properly were
automatically in violation of the law and subject to criminal
penalties. It was hard to tell the business community that the SEC
would be reasonable in its administration of the Act when it had
staff members at conferences telling people that this Act meant
exactly what it said. Even a mistake transposing figures would be
a violation. Without a materiality standard, some people thought
perfection was required. Of course, perfection is not possible. Any
internal accounting control system is imperfect. You have to be
able to review your systems of internal control; you have to have
the ability to change it. Indeed, a system of internal controls
which does not have the capability to undergo regular review and
monitoring may not be a good system of internal accounting control. Part of the problem was that no one really knew.
I think that, to date, fourteen cases have been brought by the
SEC under the accounting provisions. There were, however, many
more investigations, many involving assertions that the Act reachhttps://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/3
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ed conduct which was clearly not material in any sense. I can say
that because I was involved in some of them. It is only fair to say
that the Commission did not pursue most of these situations beyond the investigative stage. Nevertheless, the companies had to
pay considerable legal fees to defend themselves. Word spread
among the corporate community that certain types of behavior
were being looked at by the SEC. This was troublesome to the corporate community because the companies did not know what was
expected of them. They would hear one thing from their lawyers,
another thing from their accountants, and still another from the
SEC.
Partly as a result of this uncertainty, there was a movement
which resulted in S. 708 being passed in the Senate. This Bill
reworks the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 9 It is true that the
momentum for amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
also attributable to its antibribery provisions and their effect on
trade. But there was also the concern that corporations had overreacted, spending enormous amounts of money to change their
systems of internal accounting control- sums which were not costjustified. Corporations still did not understand what was intended
and what was meant, so there was pressure on both sides to try to
change the provision.
Let me describe briefly certain problems which occurred with
the very simple language of the accounting provisions. The first is
the lack of any materiality standard in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In addition, there is the problem of deciding what
"reasonable detail" means. These words were added at the last
moment when Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, and it was done out of a concern that an unqualified standard
might connote an unrealistic degree of precision. The addition of
the words "in reasonable detail" makes clear that the records
should conform to accepted methods of accounting which would
prevent off-the-book slush funds and the payment of bribes.
What does that language mean in the context of regular
transactions, putting aside illegal payments, slush funds and
bribes? As an example, suppose an invoice is sent to a customer
and the invoice reflects that the sale amount is one hundred
dollars. One hundred dollars is then owed and the payment is due.
9. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981). These proposed
changes to the FCPA are reprinted in Appendix II, infra.
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The terms of the payment may or may not be included. Now
assume that a separate document reflects an agreement with the
purchaser that a purchase of fifty million dollars during a sixmonth period will qualify him for a ten percent volume discount. If
that agreement does not show up on the face of the original invoice, is there a violation? Taken in isolation, does the absence of
the terms of the agreement constitute a violation? Some said that
it did, and there was debate on this question.
There is a problem of what to do when you have to take a
group of documents to piece together what happened in some transaction. Part of the answer may depend upon whether the
auditors have been given access to all the documents, so they have
the opportunity to know what is going on. If a second set of books
exists, then we have a different type of problem, because that
seemingly constitutes false entries. I am speaking of an incomplete document which is accurate on its face, unless you take
the position that it is inaccurate because it fails to reflect the discount which was made available in a separate arrangement.
There is another problem which stems from the use of the
word "records" in the Act. On the implications of the use of the
word "records," Dan Goelzer said:
The scope of the accuracy requirement is not, however, limited
to records which are a part of the accounting system or incident
to the preparation of financial statements. Section 3(a)(37) of the
Securities Exchange Act defines "records" to mean, "accounts,
correspondence, memoranda, tapes, disk, paper, books, and other
documents or transcribed information of any type, whether expressed in ordinary or machine language." Thus, Congress's use
of the term "records" suggests that virtually any tangible embodiment of information made or kept by an issuer is within the
scope of section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at
least if it pertains to the recording of "economic events." 10

Goelzer's comments show what I believe to have been an
unintended meaning applied to the word "records" by the SEC.
The word "records" does appear in the Act, but the language does
not limit the definition to "accounting records." The SEC's definition of the word is broader than was intended when the Act was
written. Nevertheless, the SEC asserts the broadest possible
meaning. Therefore, if someone keeps notes which do not ac10. Goelzer, supra note 6, at 23-24.
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curately reflect what he wanted to say, he may be in trouble, even
if the notes are not going anywhere.
The four objectives of internal accounting control set forth in
the statute come directly out of the accounting literature. They
were deliberately taken from the accounting literature so that
they would be understood by accountants. It was expected that
people would interpret the language in the same way that accountants had been doing it for years. I would add, however, that the accountants said that non-accountants would not understand the
language, which was only intended for special accounting purposes, and opposed incorporating accounting language into the
Act. 11
The auditing literature does contain a definition of "reasonable assurances:" it is basically a cost-benefit analysis. Every business decision must balance the cost of a perfect system against the
cost of any other system or control. If the benefits of a system do
not outweigh the costs, one would not implement those particular
controls. That language, however, was not explicitly incorporated
as part of the statute, and there continues to be debate and uncertainty about exactly what "reasonble assurances" mean, how
much latitude a board of directors has to make business judgments, and whether the SEC would defer to those business judgments.
There is also a question regarding state of mind (scienter),
which relates to enforcement proceedings. In order for the SEC to
bring an action, does the offender have to violate the Act knowingly? If you scribbled something down without any thought that you
were doing anything wrong, would that be enough to constitute a
violation? The SEC took the position that there was no scienter requirement: Congress intended to reach all types of conduct,
whether negligent, willful, or knowing. Consequently, there was
disagreement between the ABA, the SEC, and the corporate community.
A further issue which needed clarification deals with subsidiaries. The statute expressly addresses issuers, but it does not
mention the subsidiaries of issuers. A question was raised at
almost the first conference that was held on the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act about whether the scope of the Act extended to subsidiaries. Speaking for myself, I think it is fairly clear that if the
11.

AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS
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Act does not include the subsidiaries, its intended purposes would
be defeated. Nevertheless, the debate about subsidiaries continues. It becomes especially important when corporations own
less than fifty percent of their subsidiaries, and consequently do
not really control them. There may be subsidiaries where the corporation owns fifty percent because it is required by the laws of
the foreign country, but there is no operating control over that
subsidiary. There are also companies which own even less of the
subsidiary. Under the equity method of accounting, one is deemed
to have significant influence if one owns between twenty and fifty
percent of the subsidiary. Does that mean that the company can
dictate how the subsidiary maintains its books and records? It was
not always clear to a U.S. company which owned twenty-five percent of a foreign company that it could go in and tell the company
how to maintain its books and records. Many of the foreign companies did not appreciate the U.S. companies instructing them
about the SEC's new record-keeping requirements.

III.

RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM

Legislative interest in amending the FCP A was first expressed by Senator Chafee of Rhode Island. At about the same time,
there was a fair amount of debate within the SEC concerning the
proper interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The
Commission itself was not of one mind on many issues, and there
were extensive debates within the Commission. Decisions were
not lightly reached. In January of 1981, the SEC issued a policy
statement which, in an effort to blunt the proposed legislation,
significantly restated the SEC's prior position. In that statement,
the SEC said that the reasonableness standard did not mandate
exactness in record-keeping, and the reasonable assurances standard did not require the achievement of an ideal system. The Commission stated that it recognized that the concept of reasonableness tolerated certain deviations and encompassed cost-benefit
analysis. It indicated its willingness to be deferential, stating
that it would only bring actions when there was knowing or reckless conduct. This was a significant change from what the SEC had
said in the past.
On the question of subsidiaries, the SEC set forth the rebuttable presumption of responsibility for subsidiaries between twenty and fifty percent. The important thing was that with respect to
scienter, the SEC would bring actions only for knowing or reek-
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less conduct. That was, in a sense, a scienter standard: the SEC
was not looking for inadvertent errors, but would instead look to
top management's degree of involvement as one of its tests to see
whether it would bring enforc·e ment actions.
If the SEC had come out with its policy statement earlier, it
might have greatly reduced the uncertainty and the pressure
which occurred. At this point in time, however, the legislation had
moved forward. Senate Bill 708, as passed by the Senate, made
some significant changes in the accounting provision. The first
change was that the books and records provision, section 13(b)(2)(A),
was changed to reflect a new objective of internal accounting control. The purpose of this move was to remove the books and records
provision as an independent basis for enforcement actions by the
SEC, but to leave the provision as a component of a system of internal accounting control. I am not convinced that this is consistent
with traditional notions of internal accounting control. It probably
belongs more in a criminal provision if it is intended to facilitate the
prosecution of bribes or illegal payments. Senate Bill 708 represents a compromise as it now stands, and I am not sure that it
accomplishes its purpose.
In addition, the legislation has decriminalized the accounting
sanction for issuers who do not maintain a system of internal accounting controls which meets the objectives set forth in the
FCPA. That should be contrasted to circumvention of a system of
internal accounting controls which is established. In that situation,
a person may be either civilly or criminally liable for deliberate
circumvention of a system established by an issuer. There are new
scienter provisions put into the Act with respect to the company:
if a good faith defense is made, the individual must be shown to
have knowingly caused the issuer to fail to devise or maintain a
system of internal accounting controls.
There is also a definition of "reasonable assurances" in the
legislation which has an interesting provision. It says:
[F]or the purpose of this section the term "reasonable
assurances" and "reasonable detail" mean such level of detail
and degree of assurances that would satisfy prudent individuals
in the conduct of their own affairs, having in mind a comparison
between benefits to be obtained and costs to be incurred in obtaining such benefits. 12
12. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981), reprinted in
Appendix II, infra.
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The prudent person language comes from testimony by the SEC.
My problem with it is that it talks about a prudent individual in
the conduct of his own affairs. I think everyone intended to talk
about the prudent businessman in the conduct of affairs similar to
the affairs about which the judgment is being made. I think this
needs clarification in the hearings that are going on in the House
at this time.

IV.

FUTURE CHANGES

The House is continuing to meander through hearings on the
accounting provisions and they will conduct further hearings this
term. Whether they actually consider a bill is a question which
other members of the panel can discuss later this session. The Administration has supported S. 708 essentially as it was enacted by
the Senate, with certain technical changes.
As a final thought, let me point out that there are different
views about why the accounting provisions were included in the
Act. Let me give one reason that may not be immediately apparent, because it is totally unrelated to foreign payments and corrupt practices. Some people believe that auditing in the future will
move towards auditing systems of internal control, rather than
auditing the books and records of a corporation, and that this
movement has been engendered by the internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Its controls force companies to make the initial expenditure to get their systems in good
shape, and this will produce long-term cost-savings benefits as
well as changes in the method of accounting. I think that these
benefits, although in many ways unrelated to the FCPA, have
been very beneficial.
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